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"Chimes of Freedom:"'
International Human Rights and
Institutional Mental Disability Law
Michael L. Perlin*
The past thirty years have witnessed a revolution in American mental
disability law. This revolution is one that largely constitutionalized virtually
every aspect of the involuntary civil commitment and release process, as well
as most "pressure points" in the course of institutionalization (the right to
treatment, the right to refuse treatment, the right to the least restrictive alterna-
tive course of treatment). It saw the first broad-based, federal civil rights stat-
utes enacted on behalf of persons with mental disabilities. It witnessed the
creation of a "patients' bar" to provide legal representation to such persons.
Paradoxically, it also saw both a ferocious backlash against forensic patients
(especially, but not solely, persons found not guilty by reason of insanity), and
a "widening of the net," that, by "blurring" the boundaries of civil and crimi-
nal mental disability law, has increased the categories of persons subject to the
involuntary civil commitment power (to now include those charged with cer-
tain sexually violent offenses and persons subject to "assisted outpatient com-
mitment"). 2 This revolution continues today, and there is no reason to expect
any abatement in case law, statutory amendments, or advocacy initiatives in
the coming years.
But it is a revolution that has largely been a parochial one. There have
been important developments in other nations - both in common and civil
law countries - but, by and large, this has been an American revolution.
1. BOB DYLAN, Chimes of Freedom, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Warner Bros.
1964).
* Professor Michael L. Perlin is a Professor of Law at New York Law School. Rutgers
University, B.A. 1966; Columbia University School of Law, J.D. 1969.
2. See generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
(1989); id. (2d ed. 1998-2001).
Important cases include: Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471
(1999); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993);
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); Mills
v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F. 2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F. 2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980);
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D.
Wis. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub. nom.; Rivers v.
Katz, 504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986).
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This is curious to some extent. For the conditions that led reformers to
launch a series of well-orchestrated attacks on institutional care and on the
involuntary civil commitment process in the United States certainly exist in
other nations. If there has ever been any question about this, the stunningly
graphic and comprehensive reports done by Mental Disability Rights Interna-
tional ("MDRI") on conditions in Hungary, Uruguay, and Mexico eliminate
any lingering doubt.3 Yet, for a variety of reasons, there have been few legal
developments in these countries - and others similarly-situated - that paral-
lel what has happened in the United States over the past thirty years.
In the past two years, I have attempted to make a modest change in this
picture. Under the auspices of MDRI, I have traveled to Budapest, to Tallinn,
to Riga, to Budapest again, and to Sofia, to consult with activists, advocates,
progressive mental health professionals, and lawyers providing legal services
to persons with mental disabilities. In Budapest, I spoke to members of the
Psychiatric Interest Forum; in Tallinn, to members and officials of the Esto-
nian Psychiatric Patients Advocacy Association; in Riga, to members of the
Latvian Center on Human Rights and Ethnic Studies. In Budapest, I also met
with the secretary of the National Disability Affairs Council, the secretary of
the Hungarian Association for Persons with Mental Handicap, and the head of
the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union. In Tallinn and Riga, I conferred with
law school students and faculty. During my second trip to Budapest, I met
with activists from Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, Poland, the Czech Republic,
and other nations. While in Sofia, I had discussions with activist lawyers and
advocates from some of these same nations, as well as from Albania. I also
worked with members of the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee, and a representa-
tive of Amnesty International.
In each venue, I presented mini-versions of my two introductory mental
disability law courses (Mental Health Law, and Criminal Law and Procedure:
The Mentally Disabled Defendant), stressing issues involving involuntary civil
commitment, institutional rights, deinstitutionalization, and advocacy. In
Latvia, I also participated in a set of on-site visits to facilities for persons
institutionalized because of mental disabilities. My aim in each case was to
"brainstorm" with workshop participants about the optimal sort of
ombudsman/advocacy project for each country, to see what kinds of problems
were indigenous to those nations, and which were global. It was no surprise
that the pictures that I saw in January 2002, from facilities in Bulgaria - half-
dressed patients in cage-like rooms, feces smeared on the wall - eerily re-
flected the conditions at Willowbrook State School in New York City when
3. MDRI is a non-governmental advocacy organization dedicated to the recognition and
enforcement of the rights of people with mental disabilities. See http://www.mdri.org (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2002).
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they were exposed to a stunned nation some thirty years ago by the then-
fledgling investigative reporter Geraldo Rivera.
4
Teaching in Central and Eastern Europe taught me that the way we treat
persons with mental disabilities - in institutions and in the community - is
an international human rights issue, and it must be discussed, conceptualized,
and taught in that context. It was that experience that led me to think about the
need for today's program.
Before speaking further about today's symposium, there is one more
"outside event" that I need to share with you: the development of New York
Law School's distance learning, on-line Mental Disability Law course. Since
the fall of 2000, we have been offering this program (basically a combination
of the two introductory mental disability law courses to which I have already
referred) domestically to lawyers, advocates, and mental health professionals.
Early in January 2002, we launched our first international course in Tokyo.
5
We are now actively seeking philanthropic grant funding to allow us to offer
this program to an audience of activists and advocates from Central and East-
ern European nations. I tell you this now, because I believe that it may prove
the best way of disseminating the important information that is at the core of
much of the work that you will be hearing about all day today.
What will this course do, and how does it relate to today's program? I
expect and hope that the Central & Eastern Europe ("C&EE") "section" of the
Internet course will satisfy these objectives:
1. Provide participants with a firm grounding in all aspects
of mental disability law - institutional, forensic, and
private;
2. Offer them an opportunity to learn how the "law on the
books"/"law in action" dichotomy - a gap that has
plagued mental disability law for the past three decades
- can best be resolved in the C&EE context; and
3. Allow them to interact in a collaborative way to search
for solutions to problems unique to C&EE.
The international iterations of this course include:
- twelve hours of videotapes, which I prepared;
4. See Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public interest Law, 25
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 487, 507 (1999) (characterizing the conditions of the New
York institution in the Willowbrook experience as "shockingly inhumane").
5. In the fall of 2002, some six months after the conference at which this paper was origi-
nally delivered, New York Law School expanded its Internet course to offer a section in Nicara-
gua. We are currently seeking grant funding to expand that course to other Central American
nations as well. Virtually all of the commentary in this paper on the expansion of this course to
other nations in Central and Eastern Europe applies equally to potential expansion in Central
America.
42520021
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- a notebook of readings, cases, and materials to supplement the
casebook (MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS) 6 and book of
readings (THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL);
7
- weekly reading assignments with "focus questions;"
- on-going, threaded, on-line message boards;
- a weekly, moderated on-line chat room; and
- two live two day-long seminars, one at the beginning of the course,
and one at the conclusion.
The course substantively focuses on civil/constitutional issues (involun-
tary civil commitment, institutional rights, the right to refuse treatment, and
deinstitutionalization), criminal issues (competencies, the insanity defense,
sentencing, sexually violent predator acts, and the importance of mental disa-
bility in criminal trial process issues, such as confessions, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the death penalty), and tort law.8 Unlike the domestic
sections, it also includes an advocacy-training component, specifically tailored
for the needs of attorneys, activists, and advocates in C&EE.9 I have included
this additional material for several reasons:
First, I am convinced - after thirteen years of practicing law and eigh-
teen of teaching it - that the presence of a vigorous, independent advocacy
system (with trained, specialized counsel) is perhaps the most critical issue in
determining whether any true mental health law reform is possible in any ju-
risdiction.10 Second, there are multiple advocacy models, some of which may
be more easily "transportable" to the civil law countries of Europe than others;
this component will help participants assess which models will "work better"
in their nations (as an aside, I certainly do not believe there is necessarily a
"one size fits all" model of advocacy for all the nations in C&EE). Third, my
earlier trips to Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria, have clarified for me
the importance of this issue to those who are likely participants in this course;
probably a majority of the questions that I was asked in all of the programs in
which I participated dealt with issues of advocacy models, ombudsmen
projects, etc. Finally, I have written extensively about this issue in a domestic
6. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1999).
7. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL XVii-
xix (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE]. In this book, I discuss the sanist and
pretextual roots of mental disability law. By "sanist," I mean the irrational prejudice that is of
the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.
8. The course that has been offered in the U.S. has lasted, variously, fourteen or sixteen
weeks; this has been reduced to twelve for international iterations of the course.
9. I plan to team-teach the live seminars (on-site in C&EE) with Iva Szeli, one of the other
participants in this Symposium, as well as a local advocate/human rights specialist/attorney (a
resident of the nation in which the live seminars would be held).
10. See Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden:" The Role of
Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 207 (1996).
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context, and am eager to see the extent to which the conclusions that I have
reached over the past three decades apply in an international setting."
Earlier, I stated in summary fashion the objectives of the course. Let me
now address each of these in a bit more detail, and explain how it links up with
today's program.
1. It will provide participants with a firm grounding...
There is a remarkable overlap between the body of decisions that define
American constitutional mental disability law and the body of international
human rights standards that mandate humane treatment of persons with mental
disability in every nation in the world. 12 Internationally, there is a shameful
history of human rights abuses in psychiatric institutions: the provision of
services in a segregated setting that cuts people off from society, often for life;
the arbitrary detention from society that takes place when people are commit-
ted to institutions without due process; the denial of a person's ability to make
choices about their life when they are put under plenary guardianship; the
denial of appropriate medical care or basic hygiene in psychiatric facilities; the
practice of subjecting people to powerful and dangerous psychotropic medica-
tions without adequate standards; and the lack of human rights oversight and
enforcement mechanisms to protect against the broad range of abuses in
institutions. 13
Mental Illness Principles ("MI Principles") approved by the United Na-
tions can be used as a guide to the interpretation of international human rights
covenants as they apply to people with mental disabilities. In the case of
Congo v. Ecuador,14 for example, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights made this finding:
[T]he Commission considers that in the present case the guar-
antees established under article 5 of the American Convention
must be interpreted in light of the Principles for the Protection
of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of
Mental Health Care. These principles were adopted by the
11. See PERLIN, supra note 2, at ch. 2B (2d ed. 1998); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L.
Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (1982); Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of
the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, International Human Rights Advo-
cacy under the "Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 257 (1993).
13. Violations such as these are documented in the reports prepared by Mental Disability
Rights International in its comprehensive and well-publicized studies of the systems in Uru-
guay, Hungary, and Mexico. MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
HEALTH: MEXICO (2000); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
HEALTH: HUNGARY (1997); MENTAL DISABILITY RIGHTS INT'L, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MENTAL
HEALTH: URUGUAY (1995), available at http://www.mdri.org/publications/index.htm [hereinaf-
ter MDRI STUDIES].
14. Congo v. Ecuador, Case No. 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 475 (1999) (citations omitted).
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United Nations General Assembly as a guide to the interpreta-
tion in matters of protection of human rights of persons with
mental disabilities, which this body regards as a particularly
vulnerable group. 15
The case continued in a footnote:
The UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental
Illness are regarded as the most complete standards for protec-
tion of the rights of persons with mental disability at the inter-
national level. These Principles serve as a guide to States in
the design and/or reform of mental health systems and are of
utmost utility in evaluating the practices of existing systems.
Mental Health Principle 23 establishes that each State must
adopt the legislative, judicial, administrative, educational, and
other measures that may be necessary to implement them.
These Principles are also standards of assessment that makes
international human rights monitoring by NGO's more
possible. 
1 6
This course will teach participants the basics of all the major components
of mental disability law: civil/constitutional mental disability law, institu-
tional mental disability law, forensic mental disability law, and private mental
disability tort law. It will illuminate the parallels with international human
rights law (flowing from the promulgation of United Nations' standards, prin-
ciples, treaties, and international court decisions) in such a way that partici-
pants will be able to most effectively integrate the substance of the law into
the practice of mental disability law (and mental disability advocacy) in Cen-
tral & Eastern Europe.
2. The "law on the books"/"law in action" dichotomy...
There is a gap that has plagued American mental disability law since it
began. Cases are decided on the Supreme Court level, yet are not imple-
mented in the states. The United States Supreme Court has articulated sophis-
ticated doctrine, for example, by mandating dangerousness as a prerequisite
for an involuntary civil commitment finding, yet trial courts ignore that doc-
trine.17 The Supreme Court has issued elaborate guidelines to be used in cases
of criminal defendants who will likely never regain their competence to stand
15. Id. at para. 54.
16. Id. at n.8; see also MDRI STUDIES, supra note 12; Eric Rosenthal, International Human
Rights Protections for Institutionalized People with Disabilities: An Agenda for International
Action, Annex B, Delivered at Let the World Know: International Seminar on Human Rights
and Disability (Nov. 5-9, 2000) (prepared for U.N. Special Rapporteur Bengt Linqvist, suggests
an agenda for international action based on MDRI's experience working with the MI Principles
and the international convention).
17. See generally PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 6, at 59-76.
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trial, yet, nearly thirty years later, half of the fifty states still ignore these
standards.' 8 This gap is a reflection of the level of pretextuality that perme-
ates American mental disability law. By "pretextuality", I mean
that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial
dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently mer-
etricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, espe-
cially expert witnesses, show a 'high propensity to purposely
distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.' This
pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judi-
cial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, de-
means participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase
judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. 19
As a result of this pretextuality, the law on the books is often little more than
an illusion; "successful" cases brought on behalf of persons with mental disa-
bilities are often little more than "paper victories."
20
Residents of Central and Eastern European nations are no strangers to
pretextuality in many other areas of the law. I hope that through this course I
will be able to help participants identify the pretexts endemic to mental disa-
bility law, and to develop strategies for dealing with these pretexts in their
work. A recent analysis of the European Commission on Human Rights, by
way of example, concluded that that body has interpreted the European Con-
vention on Human Rights "very restrictively in psychiatric cases."'2 1 The
cases analyzed in this article - cases that characterize the handcuffing of
patients as "therapeutically necessary"2 2 or that sanction the use of seclusion
for "disciplinary" purposes 23 - certainly bespeak pretextuality. It is essential
that such pretextuality be identified and answered.
3. Interactive collaboration...
Many of the problems faced in C&EE are regional ones that flow from
decades of totalitarian regimes. Currently-existing advocacy programs are
18. Grant Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The Uncivil Commitment of
Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1993).
19. Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise:" Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the
Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 Hous-
TON L. REV. 999, 1046-47 (2000) (citations omitted).
20. Michael S. Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND
HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie Bradley & Gary Clarke eds., 1976). I discuss the implications
of this concept in, inter alia, Perlin, supra note 19, at 1049.
21. David Hewitt, Do Human Rights Impact on Mental Health Law?, 151 NEW L. J. 1278,
1278 (2001).
22. Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 15 Eur. Ct. H.R. 437 (1993), discussed in Hewitt, supra note
21, at 1278.
23. Dhoest v. Belgium, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. 135 (1987), discussed in Hewitt, supra note 21, at
1278.
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often modest and operate on "shoestring budgets." I believe that an interactive
program, such as the one I am describing, offers participants an excellent op-
portunity for on-going, robust interaction in a supportive environment.
One of the course's features is permanent message boards on its web-site.
Each week the instructor begins a new "threaded message" discussing that
week's readings. All participants are encouraged to join in and discuss the
reading and the videotapes prior to the chatroom session. Each week in the
chatroom, the students and the mentor professor discuss the readings, focusing
on a few of the most critical issues raised in the cases and materials. The
conversation is free-wheeling, but always respectful. Time, literally, flies.
And new ideas circulate with dizzying speed. After the chatroom sessions,
flurries of e-mails - both to the entire group and to individuals - explore
further and in greater depth some of the ideas pursued in the chatroom. The
written assignments build on the readings, the tape viewings, the message
boards, and the chatrooms. The in-person seminars are the culmination of the
course.
Now, how does all this link up with today's program? I have several
answers:
1. The hub of today's program is MDRI's release of its scathing Hungary
social care home report.24 That report excoriates the conditions of individuals
in these facilities, and demonstrates the extent to which social reform efforts
are needed. To plan a meaningful and potentially effective strategy, it is nec-
essary to consider all of the past efforts (some successful, some not) over the
past three decades of institutional litigation in the United States.
2. Hungary is not the only nation in its region in need of such social
reform. You will also be hearing about conditions in Bulgaria (to which I
have already alluded), and how other human rights groups have mobilized to
meet that challenge. There is no over-estimating the significance of this: fi-
nally, abuses of persons with mental disabilities are being considered human
rights abuses. Again, there is a parallel here worth thinking about: it was not
until 1972 that the United States Supreme Court - in the case of Jackson v.
Indiana25 - first held that the due process clause applied to the "nature and
duration" of the involuntary civil commitment process. It would have been
inconceivable to hold this conference the day before that case was decided. It
is only when we reach a consensus that abuses in institutions for persons with
mental disabilities are human rights violations that conferences, such as this
one, will be replicated regularly in other nations.
3. I am thus convinced that although the problems in C&EE appear very
different from the problems we face here, it is absolutely essential that consti-
tutional developments over the past thirty years in the United States (develop-
24. See Symposium, International Human Rights Law and the Institutional Treatment of
Persons with Mental Disabilities: The Case of Hungary, 21 N.Y.L SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
339 (2002).
25. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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ments that form the basis of much of the international human rights law that
will be the focus of today's program) be contextualized for advocates and
activists. I believe that the most cost-efficient and effective means of doing
that is via an Internet-based course.
4. Having said all of this, there are other issues involved that need to be
considered as well: court processes, litigation, jurisprudence, the relationship
between these human rights questions and broader political matters. Each of
these will be addressed as well in the context of this program.
Our program is divided into four main segments, each one of which will
be moderated by a New York Law School professor: myself, Stephen
Ellmann, Terry Cone, and Paul Dubinsky. I am grateful to my colleagues for
their help. In the first segment, Dr. tva Szeli, Director of European Opera-
tions in MDRI's Budapest office, will speak on "International Mental Disabil-
ity Law: The Central & Eastern European Experience." Dr. Szeli, a lawyer
and a psychologist (as well as a frequent co-collaborator who has traveled with
me through the old town neighborhoods of Riga and Tallinn on my never-
ending search for Bob Dylan rarities) will discuss her work throughout the
region, as well as her work in Hungary (both on the social care home report
and other initiatives). Also, Krassimir Kanev, a human rights advocate with
the Bulgaria Helsinki Committee, will talk about "International Mental Disa-
bility Law and Human Rights Law: The Helsinki Committee Perspective,"
and share with us the first important connections between the mental disability
law "movement" and the international human rights movement.
In the second segment, three speakers, Dr. Katalin Peto, Eszter Kismodi,
Esq., and Gabor Gombos (a psychiatrist, lawyer, and advocate for persons
with mental disabilities), will each discuss the social care home report: what it
says, how it came to be drafted, how the hands-on research was performed,
and what its implications are for other nations in the region. Then, two New
York Law School students, Sara Rotkin '02 and Jean Bliss '03, both of whom
accompanied me to Budapest on my trip in October 2001, will present a report
on that conference, and how it gave "life to advocacy ideals."
The third segment is one presentation by Eric Rosenthal, Executive Di-
rector of MDRI, in Washington, DC. He is the one person in the world most
responsible for meaningful human rights reform in psychiatric institutions in
Central and Eastern Europe. He will speak on "The Application of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law to Institutional Mental Disability Law," contextual-
izing today's programs in both contexts.
Then, there will be four interlinked presentations from four different per-
spectives. I've entitled it, "Bridging the Gap: American and Other Perspec-
tives," in an effort to demonstrate how what we are talking about today is
related to a variety of important jurisprudential, political, social, and judicial
perspectives. Professor Bruce Winick, from the University of Miami Law
2002]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
School, and one of the founders of the school of "therapeutic jurisprudence, '26
will speak on "Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives" on the questions
before us. Professor Robert Dinerstein, of American University Law School is
one of the few American law professors who has done significant social re-
form work in this area of the world,2 7 will speak on "Guardianship Reform
Perspectives." Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren, of the Broward County Criminal
Court in Florida, and the judge who sits on what is, by all accounts, the best
Mental Health Court in the nation,28 will discuss "Court Systems Perspec-
tives." And finally, Professor Elizabeth Duquette, who teaches at both the
University of Chicago and Northwestern Law Schools, 29 will place this in a
greater political context, by speaking on "European Union Perspectives."
Now finally, a word about my title. As more than a few of you have
already guessed, there's a Bob Dylan connection. My title comes, in part,
from Dylan's all-too-rarely heard masterpiece, Chimes of Freedom,30 a com-
position that critic Robert Shelton has characterized as Dylan's "most political
song" and an expression of "affinity" for a "legion of the abused. '31 The first
verse of the song concludes:
Flashing for the warriors whose strength is not to fight,
Flashing for the refugees on the unarmed road of flight,
An' for each an' ev'ry underdog soldier in the night,
An' we gazed upon the chimes of freedom flashing.
32
I cannot think of a finer way of characterizing what we are discussing here
today.
CONCLUSION
This is not an easy effort. As you will learn from many of our upcoming
speakers, there is much resistance, much opposition, and much more to do.
But I am confident that, eventually, we will succeed; the importance of this
26. See, e.g., DAVID WEXLER & BRUCE WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOP-
MENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (Carolina Academic Press ed., 1996).
27. Professor Dinerstein serves on the board of directors of Mental Disabilities Rights Inter-
national, and Institute Evros, the European Advocacy Information Centre, in Ljubljana, Slove-
nia. His international work, in disability and clinical legal education, has taken him to Chile,
Columbia, Peru, Hungary, Poland, Montenegro, Japan, and Slovenia, among other places.
28. See, e.g., LeRoy Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty
Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 373 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Elizabth Duquette, Human Rights in the European Union: Internal Versus
External Objectives, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 363 (2001).
30. DYLAN, supra note I.
31. ROBERT SHELTON, No DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 220
(1997). Id. at 197 (explaining use of phrase). I have used a quotation from this song in a title
once before: Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw:" The Impact of the ADA on
the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193
(2000).
32. DYLAN, supra note 1.
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enterprise is too important to ignore. A revolution in mental disability law has
changed the way we think about, treat, and empower those persons with
mental disabilities. Trail-blazing NGOs, such as MDRI, have changed the
way we think about the relationship between human rights and mental disabil-
ity law across the globe. And, not coincidentally, a revolution in technology
has changed the way we deliver, teach, and learn information.
We will hear today about developments in Central and Eastern Europe. I
am confident that, if funding becomes available for our Internet project, we
will be able to share information, ideas, and creative solutions with other
mental disability activists in Central and Eastern Europe in a cost-efficient
way that will dramatically increase the number of individuals who will have
the capacity to provide grass roots advocacy in those nations and to restructure
the practice of mental disability law and the delivery of mental health services
in that region of the world.
I have been involved in mental disability law for thirty years. It is only in
the past two years that I have been involved with international groups seeking
solutions to international human rights-based issues. For the first time, I truly
believe I have the capacity to "gaze upon the chimes of freedom flashing.
33
33. Id.
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